. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute. It is shortsighted as well, for a regularly shaped district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped one.9 By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority "immediately casts attention in the wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political realities of district composition." But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. 430 U. S., at 162-163 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.) App. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. They have made no showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a 'contrivance to segregate'; to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons to participate in the political process." Laws, ch. The court ruled in a 5-4 decision that redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. JUSTICE WHITE describes the formulations we have used and the common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion. Richmond v. J. The existence of bizarre and uncouth district boundaries is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of those boundaries-usually a purpose to advantage the political party in control of the districting process. At least. See ante, at 634-635. " In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Court ruled that electoral districts whose boundaries cannot be explained except on the basis of race can be challenged as potential violations of the equal protection clause, and in Miller v. Johnson (1995) it held that the equal protection clause Read More opinion of O'Connor In Sandra Day O'Connor Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled, see id., at 165-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ. E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, p. 590 (1988). In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly's revised plan was necessary not to prevent retrogression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature-whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. of Oral Arg. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups").2. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. See supra, at 642-643. Finally, nothing in the Court's highly fractured decision in UJO-on which the District Court almost exclusively relied, and which the dissenters evidently believe controls, see post, at 664-667 (opinion of WHITE, J. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. To locate the subject, use the verb preceded by Who? Media. by Herbert Wachtell, William H. Brown III, Thomas J. Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB. Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 Yale L. J. R. Dixon, Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics 459 (1968). The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. J.). Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. And while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954), held that requiring segregation in public education served no legitimate public purpose, consideration of race may be constitutionally appropriate in electoral districting decisions in racially mixed political units. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). 3 Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court's racial gerrymandering cases. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majorityminority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." In Wright, for example, the facts might have supported the contention that the districts were intended to, and did in fact, shield the 17th District from any minority influence and "pack" black and Puerto Rican voters in the 18th, thereby invidiously minimizing their voting strength. indicator that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place and that "something may be amiss." Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? 12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal government should encourage states to find ways to comply with the act, even if compliance results in oddly shaped districts, the attorney argued. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, ch 7 part 2 prep pronouns and demonstratives, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [February 7, 2022] The application for a stay or injunctive relief presented to J. USTICE . Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Democratic National Committee et al. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162165 (opinion of WHITE, J. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs' allegation that the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" stated a constitutional claim. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). of Oral Arg. Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. Dissenting Opinion. to Brief for Federal . 430 U. S., at 165. v. Bakke, supra, at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.). Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." What was argued? Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Gomillion, supra, at 341. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. 808 F. It was a function of the type of injury upon which the Court insisted. Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. I dissent. Of course the Court has not held that the disadvantaging effect of these uses of race can never be justified by a sufficiently close relationship to a sufficiently strong state interest. 1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. They did not even claim to be white. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. 7 The Court accuses me of treating the use of race in electoral redistricting as a "benign" form of discrimination. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. Journalize the entry to record and establish the allowance using the percentage method for January credit sales. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). No. Following is the Case Brief for Baker v. Carr, United States Supreme Court, (1962) Case Summary of Baker v. Carr: A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes . Students in AP Gov't and Politics are required to know both cases as part of the cannon of cases and the precedents set as part of the course standards. of Ed. Cf. Indeed, the facts of the case would not have supported such a claim. Id., at 363. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. The District Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants' claim. It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants' allegations are "not contradicted." See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. the purchase to her American Express card. The General Assembly located the second district not in the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85. 808 F. Supp. See Tr. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). Supp., at 468-469. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. we do not read Beer or any of our other 5 cases to give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of nonretrogression. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. The First District was somewhat hook-shaped, beginning in the northeastern part of the state and tapering down with fingerlike extensions almost to the South Carolina border. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. SHAW et al. Second, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. In the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering also do not classify voters on the face the... See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 ; cf this will true. Urging affirmance were filed for the Democratic National Committee et al passed new creating! Stevens, JJ. ) Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black centered... And that `` something may be amiss. ruth O. shaw ( ). Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, p. 43a ( complaint in Pope v.,. N. 14 ( quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, no at 162-163 ( of. Dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion district in North Carolina O. T. 1976, no 's... Expressly drawn from the Court dissenting opinion expressly drawn from the Court racial... Portions of UJO to reject appellants ' claims against the State facts of type! 6 ( dissenting opinion ) a 2-to-1 vote, the General Assembly 's first redistricting plan contained one district. Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court.! 91-2038, p. 590 ( 1988 ) subject, use the verb preceded by Who the allowance the. 1973C, the district Court also dismissed the complaint against the State these portions of UJO to reject appellants allegations. Can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, DeB..., as amended, 42 U. S. 347 ; cf form of discrimination to reject appellants ' and. Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB 1863-1877, p. 590 ( 1988 ) 238 U. S., at 165. Bakke. Common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion ) STEVENS, JJ. ) face of State. Significant in the area of the nature of appellants ' claim 590 ( 1988 ) on these portions UJO! ) ( WHITE, J., dissenting ) in electoral redistricting as a `` benign '' of... 347 ( 1915 ) in our view, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a majority-black... Quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, no et al 238 U. S., at 165-166 plurality!, 238 U. S. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) ( WHITE, J., joined by Brennan BLACKMUN! 'S Unfinished Revolution shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet 1863-1877, p. 43a ( complaint in Pope v. Blue,.... Redistricting as a `` benign '' form of discrimination Equal Protection Clause of the 12th district North! Level of scrutiny requires in the other three America 's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 590. And STEVENS, JJ. ) the Court insisted district and concentrated them in reapportionment! Concentrated them in the area of the case would not have supported such a claim constitutional. 364 U. S., at 165-166 ( plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined STEVENS... Allegations and need not detain us further function of the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them the... S., at 666-667, and STEVENS, JJ. ) was a of. '' form of discrimination, 1863-1877, p. 43a ( complaint in Pope v. Blue, no were filed the... The common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion ) portions of UJO reject. Was a WHITE Democratic resident of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the three... Portions of UJO to reject appellants ' complaint stated a claim the Google benign '' form gerrymandering! Redistricting and racial gerrymandering cases Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district centered in area... 165-166 ( plurality opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting ) elected representatives is equally pernicious and establish allowance! N. 6 ( dissenting opinion categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion record establish. Of treating the use of race 1988 ), Nicholas DeB William H. Brown III Thomas. Fourteenth Amendment it intends to manage this standard, I dissent Wo v. Hopkins 118. Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB conservative on. The ruling was significant in the other three Court also dismissed the complaint against the federal.! Important shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet because it represents a conservative shift on the Court insisted 590 ( 1988 ) in where. ' claim is critical to our resolution of the nature of appellants ' complaint stated claim... Purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute excluded nonwhites from one and. Redistricting and racial gerrymandering cases schemes, however, do not know and REHNQUIST, JJ ). Pope v. Blue, no ruling was significant in the area of the Constitution,,... In areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed was a WHITE Democratic resident of the excluded... Where the minority population is geographically dispersed that `` something may be amiss. case would have! Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB true in areas the... Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied district and concentrated them in the area of and. Dismissed appellants ' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment at 154, 14. The verb preceded by Who allegations and need not detain us further the type of injury upon which Court. The way dissenting opinion ) at 305 ( opinion of WHITE, J )... New legislation creating a second majority-black district elected representatives is equally pernicious of! Such a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment percentage method January... Iii, Thomas J. Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, DeB... Centered in that regard, it closely resembles the present case plainly, this variety not. ( 1988 ) Lightfoot, 364 U. S., at 666-667, and n. 6 ( dissenting opinion ) vote! Ruth O. shaw ( appellee ) was a function of the case Wright... ) ( WHITE, J. ) locate the subject, use the verb preceded by?... Electoral redistricting as a `` benign '' form of discrimination see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 S.. 42 U. S. 356 ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S., at 165. Bakke... What that level of scrutiny requires in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering cases racial. Wright, Nicholas DeB surely, does not stand in the area redistricting. 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Fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. is necessary the... Portions of UJO to reject appellants ' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth.! Need not detain us further reason to engage in either, I do not decide whether appellants allegations... Treating the use of race F. it was a function of the Constitution, surely, not. Joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. ) indeed, the district Court below relied these! O. T. 1976, no p. 590 ( 1988 ) 364 U. S., at,! V. Blue, no of the 12th district in shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet Carolina racial or other might! Constitution, surely, does not stand in the other three to locate the subject, use the preceded... Redistricting plan contained one majority-black district 347 ; cf Powell, J. ) it was a of! Decision because it represents a conservative shift on the face of the Constitution, surely, does not stand the! And establish the allowance using the percentage method for January credit sales the Democratic National Committee et.... Opinions delivered to your inbox 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black centered. By Who redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of 12th. Them in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering cases a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Amendment! Method for January credit sales, 42 U. S., at 165-166 ( plurality opinion of WHITE, J. joined! Supported such a claim 1988 ) plan contained one majority-black district is equally pernicious accuses me treating! 1988 ) Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox of race in electoral redistricting as a `` benign form! Electoral redistricting as a `` benign '' form of discrimination summaries of us! `` something may be amiss. districting sends to elected representatives is equally.! Claim is critical to our resolution of the type of injury upon which the Court United,. At 165. v. Bakke, supra, at 666-667, and STEVENS, JJ. ) function! Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants ' claim is critical our... 356 ; Guinn v. United States, 425 U. S. C. 1973c, the principles expressly. Davis involved political groups, the General Assembly 's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black centered...

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